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Nationalizing the defense industry has been a priority for the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – JDP). This attempt was also interpreted as a part of Turkey’s 
move away from its Western alliances, specifically North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  
This study suggests that while Turkey’s fluctuating relations with NATO fueled its efforts to 
develop a national defense industry, the continued development of the industry relies on sustained 
relations with NATO (at least for the foreseeable future) for two reasons. First, despite the 
significant progress made, Turkey's membership in NATO created a path dependence and 
resulted in the national defense industry’s heavy reliance on NATO members for its growth. As 
a result, the industry is still tied primarily to NATO allies for the sustained imports of technology, 
parts and licensing. Second, the coercive instruments at NATO’s disposal (sanctions and 
embargoes) increase the costs of a potential departure from the Alliance.  
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When, the then prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced JDP’s 
‘2023 Political Vision’ (2023 Siyasi Vizyonu) in 2011, the development of ‘national 
tank, national aircraft, national ship and national satellite’ was listed among national 
defense policy goals (Sabah 2011). In early 2019, the head of the Presidency of 
Defense Industries summarized Turkey’s goals about its national defense industry as 
‘By 2053, the Turkish defense industry aims to be 100 percent independent with an 
export capacity of $50 billion’ (Demirtaş 2019). Regardless of the feasibility of this 
goal, it is true that Turkey has made observable progress in developing its national 
defense industry. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
categorized Turkey as an ‘emerging producer’ in its 2020 report along with Brazil and 
India (SIPRI 2020a).  
While Turkey’s desire to develop its national defense industry is a techno-
nationalist project that aims to increase Turkey’s role and power within the 
international system, it is also informed by the insecurity that Turkey feels about the 
existing security protection it gets through its primary defense alliance, the NATO. 
As a reaction to reoccurring tensions between Turkey and NATO countries, in 
general, and the USA in particular, Turkey not only started to invest heavily into its 
defense industry but also took steps to diversify its defense capacity.  
In December 2017, Turkey announced that it concluded a deal with Russia 
for the procurement of the S-400 missile defense system. The announcement met 
with strong criticism from Turkey’s NATO allies that voiced concerns about the 
compatibility of the system with NATO’s defense structure. The deal came at a time 
when the relations between Turkey and NATO are increasingly tense and when a 
perceived shift is taking place in the Turkish government’s foreign policy priorities. 
These conditions heightened the negative reaction the deal created.  
The NATO members’ discontent with Turkey’s decision to buy S-400 
escalated to such a level that Turkey got suspended from the F35 Joint Strike Fighter 
Program. Around the same time, Turkey initiated a military operation into Syria 
(Operation Peace Spring), which resulted in the initiation of an arms sales embargo 





by several NATO countries. As a reaction to the embargo, the President of Defense 
Industries İsmail Demir said in an interview ‘we did our analysis, we have taken 
measures in areas such as alternative energy sources and domestic production’ (CNN 
Türk 2019). In the face of coercive measures used by NATO, the political rhetoric 
increasingly hints at potential severance from NATO and highlights the national 
defense industry as both a reason for and instrument through which such parting 
would take place.  
It is the argument of this paper that Turkey meeting its defense needs by 
itself (and only for itself) is neither technologically nor economically or politically 
attainable or even desirable, at least in the foreseeable future. The globalized nature 
of the defense industry creates incentives for Turkey to increase its exports and 
remain engaged with the global market if it wants to keep developing its national 
defense industry. If Turkey was to be engaging in these activities in a political vacuum 
it would have, theoretically, given Turkey a free hand to pick and choose its alliances. 
However, both the historical development and the current functioning of the Turkish 
defense industry is heavily tied to its membership in NATO. On the one hand, the 
continued reliance on imports (in parts, technology as well as licensing) constitutes 
the economic and technical reasoning behind these ties. On the other hand, the 
embeddedness of NATO in Turkey’s defense structure, policies, and capacities in 
addition to the coercive mechanisms that the Alliance has (specifically in the form of 
sanctions and embargoes) create strong political and military incentives for Turkey to 
stay committed to NATO. Thus, while the tensions between Turkey and NATO have 
been one of the most important driving forces behind Turkey’s quest to develop a 
national defense industry, such desire in return creates incentives for Turkey to stay 
within NATO.   
The first section below details the functioning of the global defense market 
to illustrate the difficulty of reaching defense autarky. The second section discusses 
the role of NATO in shaping its members’ defense industries. NATO’s function (and 
the tools at its disposal) both as an enabler and as an inhibiter for member states’ 
quest to develop their defense industries are highlighted. The third section provides 
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a historical account of Turkey’s quest to develop a national defense industry and how 
these efforts were affected by Turkey’s membership in NATO. The paper concludes 
with a discussion on why Turkey’s desire to further develop its national defense 
industry is likely to sustain its ties with NATO rather than resulting in further 
estrangement. 
 
2. Global Defense Market and Defense Autarky 
The defense market is highly globalized and is characterized by a small 
cluster of suppliers that derive not just economic but also political power through the 
intricate web of trade in defense products. Several factors contribute to the 
globalization of the defense market. While on the one hand, the logic of economics 
has been contributing to the development of transnational defense companies, the 
desire to be self-reliant (be less dependent to the largest arms producer, the USA), for 
security and economic reasons, made more and more countries invest in their defense 
industries (Hayward 2009). Nevertheless, the structure and the functioning of the 
global defense market make reaching defense autarky economically, technologically, 
and politically extremely difficult, or even undesirable for newly established 
producers.  
When we look at today’s global defense market, what we see is somewhere 
between what techno-nationalists and techno-globalists believe in. To the distaste of 
‘techno-nationalists’, who believe in the predominance of national boundaries in the 
development of technologies, military technologies spread around the world not just 
through imperialism but also through the export of weapons and the transfer of 
weapon producing technologies (Buzan & Herring 1998). Yet, as opposed to what 
‘techno-globalists’ would argue, such expansion did not create an even market where 
technology is globally developed, produced, and consumed (Edgerton 2007). Rather 
the diffusion of military technology contributed to the unevenness of relations 
between countries, a hierarchy between the haves (which also have a hierarch within 
it depending on the types of weapons that a county can produce) and the have-nots 





which continuously fluctuates with the development of new military technologies and 
the expansion of production capabilities (Buzan & Herring 1998).  
According to the most recent ‘Arms Transfer Data’ by SIPRI, the United 
States is the largest arms exporter with close to $10.8 billion export per year, which 
is more than double of what the second-largest exporter Russia did ($4.7 billion) in 
2019 (see Table 1). Given the fact that the defense industry and arms trade is 
dominated by a few countries, and the extreme difficulties that other states face in 
their bids to be competitive internationally, it becomes important to understand why 
developing states, such as Turkey, still invest in national defense industries and what 
kind of an impact such attempts have on the global market.  
Economics of scale also creates an incentive for states to export their arms. 
Since the more advanced a military technology gets the more expensive it becomes, 
‘nearly all arms producers have strong incentives to export’ to meet their needs for 
reasonable costs (Buzan & Herring 1998, p.35). This in return ‘ease[s] [developing 
countries’] access to much-needed technology transfers for the development of their 
domestic defense industries’ and allows them to develop their indigenous defense 
industries (Kurç & Neuman 2017, p.220). 
Technological advancements such as ‘3-D printing and improved computer 
modeling and capacity for simulation’ also contributes to the globalization of defense 
suppliers as such advancements would make it possible for more companies to 
shoulder the costs of prototyping and testing (Rowlands & Kabongi 2017, p.65). Yet, 
such changes are not likely to fundamentally change the market in the short run, 
which means that further developing national defense industries will continue to rely 
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Table 1 - Ratio of arms exported to arms imported (2019 figures) 




Ratio of arms 
exported/arms 
imported 
1 United States 10752 1048 10,3 
2 Russia 4718 0,5 9436,0 
3 France 3368 102 33,0 
4 China 1423 887 1,6 
5 Germany 1185 39 30,4 
6 Spain 1061 56 18,9 
7 United Kingdom 972 377 2,6 
8 South Korea 688 1510 0,5 
9 Italy 491 186 2,6 
10 Israel 369 507 0,7 
11 Netherlands 285 490 0,6 
12 Switzerland 254 13 19,5 
13 Turkey 245 833 0,3 
14 Sweden 206 9 22,9 
15 Canada 188 200 0,9 
a As a supplier. 
b In million US$. 
Source: Table compiled by the author based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database ‘TIV of arms 
exports and arms imports’, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php; 
https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php 
 
It should be noted that while any defense industry, that wants to expand its 
operation and profit, needs to be integrated into the global market, not all countries’ 
defense industries are equally dependent on exports (see Table 1) and hence, they are 
not equally eager about the globalization of the market. In addition to the defense 
industries’ capacity, the decisions regarding the sale of arms (and to whom) is a 
balancing act between strategic and economic calculations of the states. Lucie Beraud-
Sudreau and Hugo Meijer (2016, p.58) suggest that a country’s position in the ‘world 
hierarchy of weapon producers’ as well as the defense industry’s level of dependency 





on exports shape policies. The authors suggest that if the defense budget of a country 
is big then there would be less dependency on exports and less enthusiasm to sell 
weapons. Similarly, the higher a country is on the hierarchy of weapon producers, the 
less inclined they would be to export to hold onto their ranking by preventing the 
diffusion of advanced military technologies (Beraud-Sudreau & Meijer 2016). The 
varying degrees of willingness to diffuse defense technology further contribute to the 
creation of an ever-expanding yet increasingly uneven market, where the implications 
of diffusion for states’ relative position in the international system are taken into 
account alongside the economic gains to be cultivated.   
From the perspective of developing countries, the desire to invest in their 
national defense industries is not only a result of the opportunity that the interests of 
the established producers created for it. There are security, identity, and economic 
dimensions that states take into account in prioritizing the development of their 
national defense industries. Rather than being separate concerns, these dimensions 
are intertwined. National defense industries are, at the most fundamental level, 
developed to allow a country to be self-reliant on equipping its military with necessary 
capabilities. However, they are also a source and an indicator of identity and 
international prestige that illustrates a country’s industrial and military capabilities and 
signals its strength, if need be. Bitzinger and Kim (2005) explain developing countries’ 
attempts to develop their national defense industries partly as a result of ‘techno-
nationalism’. In David E. H. Edgerton’s (2007, p.3) words, techno-nationalism is not 
only about becoming autarchic but also illustrating that a ‘country is best fitted for 
the technological age’ which supports the reimagining of national identities in the face 
of a changing global environment.  
In addition to being a source of pride and prestige, becoming an arms 
producer also has implications for a state’s relative power in the international system. 
Arms suppliers enjoy varying degrees of control on buyer states through shaping (and 
limiting) their military capabilities as well as their foreign policy (for instance through 
embargoes), which is an edge that developing countries would benefit from having 
(Neuman 1988; Boutin 2009). However, as the below analysis illustrates, states’ 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 6(2) 2020: 259-295, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v6n2p259 
266 
 
capacity to convert defense production to political power varies based on the relative 
power of the state within the international system, how advanced of a producer the 
state is, and how reliant the defense industry is to exports.   
The desire to develop a national defense industry is also driven by domestic 
motivations to create jobs and to cultivate political capital from increased economic 
wealth (Bağcı & Kurç 2017). It can also be used as a way of ‘improv[ing] balance of 
payments’ by limiting the money spent on importing weapons (Brzoska & Ohlson 
1986). As it is pointed out earlier, the national defense industry becomes a source of 
economic wealth only when it has an export component to it. Rahman and Siddiqui 
(2019) illustrate in their recent study that, while defense spending normally harms 
economic growth as it means less of the budget is spared for other areas (Ram 1995; 
Dunne & Tian 2013), when coupled with arms exports, it has a ‘positive and 
significant effect’ on GDP.  
The importance of export in the defense industry is not only limited to its 
impact on a country’s economic growth, it is also considered to be essential in 
‘maintain[ing] [the industry’s] size and sophistication’ so that if the domestic need 
arises the industry could respond quickly (Hen-Tov 2004, p.57). This leads to what 
(Moravcsik 1991) calls an ‘autarky-efficiency dilemma’, which means that even though 
the optimal scenario is to be self-sufficient in defense needs and to not sell them to 
other countries (to avoid security dilemma), the production of weaponry involves 
high costs and keeping the defense industry up to date requires continues investment, 
as such selling of weapons to other countries becomes a necessity. 
Since governments are the main buyers in the market, both domestic and 
international factors shaping their procurement decisions are of the highest 
importance for the future of any defense industry. For that reason, a country’s defense 
industry’s ability to sell its products internationally cannot be thought independently 
of that country’s relations with the others. Therefore, while increasing security 
concerns is important for defense sales, the more dependent a country’s defense 
industry is on exports the more they would be susceptible to any potential disturbance 
they might have with their trading partners. Similarly, as identified above, since 





established producers also make strategic calculations in choosing which newly 
developing industries to share their technology and collaborate in production with, 
newly developing defense industries are also vulnerable to any disturbance they might 
have with their collaborators. Thus, while developing national defense industry has a 
lot of security, political, and economic value to it, the connections through which it 
develops has a strong bearing on the trajectory of its developments. 
 
3. Military Alliances and Defense Industries: The Case of NATO 
The discussion above illustrates the unevenness of the global defense 
market and highlights the conditions that drive (and limit) the expansion of defense 
industries. The discussion also suggests that the ability of a country to develop a 
national defense industry depends on not just domestic factors but also conditioned 
upon the willingness on the part of the established producers to welcome the new 
producer into the market. This section discusses the opportunities and limitations 
that NATO, as a prominent military alliance, presents to its members’ attempts at 
developing national defense industries. 
The North Atlantic Treaty that created a mutual defense alliance among its 
members was signed in 1949 as a part of the perceived need to counter the ideological 
and territorial expansion of the Soviet Union (Sandler & Harthley 1999). As the 
political landscape evolved, first with the end of the Cold War (that brought an end 
to ‘the Soviet threat’) and then with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (that 
turned non-state actors into the biggest security threats in the international system), 
NATO found itself in a dire need to reidentify its purpose and reclaim its relevance. 
First by shifting its focus to civil wars and humanitarian crises after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and then by identifying ‘terrorism’ as the threat to defend its 
members against, NATO has tried to survive a crisis of mission and a crisis of identity. 
Currently, with the rise of populist leaders and increasing tendency to seek 
unilateralism, as seen in the steps taken by the Trump administration, NATO is facing 
yet another problem in front of its relevance and efficacy.  
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Military alliances, such as NATO are identified as important in the literature 
not just for the military protection they provide for their members but also for serving 
as a forum for communication and cooperation as well as for their function as 
‘brands’ that contribute to a state’s identity. Another dimension of military alliances 
that is less discussed is their political economy implications. Military alliances create 
a demand and supply for military supplies and encourage its members to abide by 
certain rules as to budgeting, production, and trade in arms. Military alliances, thus, 
create path dependency regarding patterns of behavior in making procurement 
decisions as to the established links, mutual understanding of threats, and a common 
identity decreases the negative externalities of arms trade for both the supplier and 
the receiver. As Callado-Munoz et al. (2019, p.1) analyzed the impact of the Alliance 
on NATO members trading in arms and found that military alliances create positive 
‘security and technology externalities’ for its members, as allies are more likely to 
procure their arms from each other.  
The earliest, and possibly the most influential study, that analyzed military 
alliances from an economic point of view was done by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). 
Using formal modeling they approached security alliances as a public good (once it 
achieves its purpose all members will enjoy the security provided regardless of their 
contribution to its creation). Taking the disproportionate share that the USA 
shoulders in collective defense spending within the NATO this study suggests that 
the ‘public good’ nature of collective security would inevitably lead to free-riding. 
Duncan Snidal (1991), taking on the issue, helps explain why the USA would be 
willing to agree to such disproportionate burden-sharing. Snidal (1991, p.720) 
suggests that ‘an asymmetric distribution of absolute gains may be a requisite for 
striking cooperative agreements among different-sized states concerned about 
relative gains’. Snidal bases his argument on the assumption that smaller states would 
be more worried about relative gains which encourage larger states to offer more as 
they would prefer an ‘unequal cooperative arrangement to no cooperation’ (Snidal 
1991, p.720).  Later scholars, however, suggested that (Murdoch 1995; Sandler & 
Harthley 2001; Rowlands and Kabongi 2017), free-riding behavior would lead to 





suboptimal defense spending unless mechanisms or norms that push for greater 
cooperation is put in place. The NATO aimed to address this problem through 
Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that ‘in order more effectively to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack’ (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). 
Thus, NATO, in theory, would support member states’ attempts at developing their 
national defense industries. 
Later studies expanded this model of military alliances and highlighted the 
nuance between defense to be enjoyed by all members of an alliance as a public good 
(such as nuclear deterrence) and as private good (impurely public benefit) owned by 
each member (such as anti-ballistic missiles) (Russett 1970; Sandler & Forbes 1980; 
Sandler 1988; Sandler & Hartley 2001; Rowlands & Kabongi 2017). This new model, 
called the ‘joint-products model’, suggests that such private gains would limit the free-
riding problem and help sustain military alliances (Oneal 1990; Sandler 1993). As 
such, these studies not only explain why states choose to invest in their defense 
industries rather than becoming ‘free-riders’ but also why members’ desire to develop 
their defense industries is not, by itself, a threat to the alliance. 
Nevertheless, the member states’ desire to become self-reliant in their 
defense needs does not need to stem from an attempt to address the free-riding 
problem to sustain the alliance but could rather results from their concerns about the 
protection they get through the alliance. The tension between the USA and the 
Western European members of the NATO alliance has long been bubbling. This 
tension led to a growing effort on the part of the European countries to develop a 
‘European security and defense identity’ (Missiroli 2002, p.9). These efforts were a 
function of European countries’ desire to make security decisions independent of the 
USA with the realization that transatlantic security interests would not necessarily 
overlap. The concerns about the divergence of interests were proven right when 
American president Donald Trump, who geared the USA toward unilateralism, 
threatened to leave the Alliance if other members would not stop ‘free-riding’ (The 
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New York Times 2018). However, such ‘threats of abandonment’ are not peculiar to 
the Trump administration, either. The historical evidence illustrates that the USA 
perceived its commitment to Europe to be temporary during the 1950s and 
threatened to leave the Alliance when in 1960s France (with the initial support of 
West Germany) pushed to be more independent (and in a leading role) when it came 
to European politics (Schuessler & Shifrinson 2019). France’s investment in 
developing nuclear weapons in the 1960s, for instance, was seen ‘not as a defense 
against the Soviet threat, but as a tool with which to free themselves from American 
domination’ (Regnault, 2003 cited in Côrte-réal Pinto 2017, p.305; Galbreath & 
Gebhard 2010). 
However closely knit they might be, alliances are still composed of self-
interested actors with varying levels of power and multiple interests that may diverge 
at any time. While such differences do not necessarily break down an alliance, 
competition, as well as mechanisms of coercion, should be taken into account in 
explaining the impact that an alliance has on a member state’s policy choices. That is 
to say, while the USA has been complaining about the disproportionate burden it 
shoulders within the NATO structure and calls for European members to pick up 
their share, the USA’s desire to share the burden does not aim to shake the relative 
power of the USA in the Alliance. As an example of this Gene Gerzhoy (2015, p.92) 
argues that what prevented West Germany’s from pursuing nuclear ambitions was 
‘the logic of alliance coercion’, ‘a strategy consisting of a patron’s [the USA’s] use of 
conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain a client’s compliance with its 
demands.’  
It can be concluded that military alliances in general and NATO, in particular, 
create both incentives for and limitations in front of member states’ attempts at 
developing national defense industries. While the powerful members of the alliance 
support such initiatives to the extent that they help share the burden of collective 
defense requirements, they object to any attempt that would shuffle the power 
dynamics within the alliance. Similarly, while concerns about the defense, that the 
alliance would provide, create a motive for states to develop their national defense 





industries, the countries, nonetheless, rely on the connections they established 
through the alliance in developing defense industries. The alliance’s power to have 
such influence over its members comes from both the patterns of behavior it creates 
but also the coercive mechanisms it entails.  
 
4. Turkey’s National Defense Industry  
 
4.1. Turkey-NATO Relations as an Impetus for the Development of National Defense Industry 
The history of the modern Turkish national defense industry can be traced 
back to the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Coming out of a war of 
independence and adopting an economic approach that relies on national capabilities, 
the state laid the early foundations of a state-led national defense industry (Côrte-réal 
Pinto 2017). While domestic factors played an important role in the development of 
the national defense industry,1 the below short historical account traces the 
development of the national defense industry in the light of Turkey-NATO relations.  
Turkey’s decision to stay out of World War II created concerns about its 
commitment to the Western camp after the war. However, Turkey’s geopolitical 
position was too important for the Western camp to leave Turkey to its devices and 
Korean War presented an opportunity for Turkey to illustrate its commitment to the 
common identity (Yılmaz & Bilgin 2005). As a result, Turkey became a NATO 
member in 1951. The early and, due to the economic limitations, modest steps are 
taken to establish a national defense industry came to a halt when Turkey joined 
 
1 It needs to be noted that while this study focuses on the international factors’ impact on the 
development of the defense industry, domestic factors also have played, and still play, a role in shaping 
these developments. In that respect, in addition to technological limitations, institutional weaknesses 
and lack of coherence in policymaking can be listed as important impediments in front of Turkey’s 
prospects for developing defense autarky (Kurç 2017). The problem of leadership which stems from 
the tension in civil-military relations found its reflection in several problems including ‘[lack of] clear 
division of responsibilities, [lack of] agreement on the appropriate structure of the defense industry, 
the ownership of the companies that belong to the Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı 
(TSKGV – Turkish Armed Forces Foundation), and the role of military factories and shipyards in 
defense production’ (Kurç 2017, p.266). 
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NATO and the surplus inventory of NATO allies transferred to Turkey free of charge 
(Kayaoğlu, 2009; Côrte-réal Pinto 2017). 
During the 1950s, as the room given to private initiatives in the economy 
expanded, the connections established through the NATO alliance, allowed Turkey 
to take steps toward developing its defense industry which started to include more 
and more private firms (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017). The early crises took place in the 
1960s, primarily with the USA, created the initial realization of the downside of 
alliances. Turkey had a fallout, primarily with the USA, first with the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in 1962 and then with the Cyprus problem in 1964 and 1974, which led to an 
arms embargo initiated in 1975 and lasted for three years (Uslu 2003; Williams 2016).  
These developments led Turkey to start questioning the ‘NATO’s commitment to 
protecting Turkish interests and led Ankara to seek ways of diversifying its foreign 
policy’ (Çelik 1999, p.2). They also demonstrated the need to develop a national 
defense industry (Günlük-Şenesen 1993; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003; Akça 2010; TASAM 
2015).   
When we came to the early 1980s, while the need for developing the national 
defense industry has become very clear, the imminent need to equip the military with 
modern arms in the face of the rising threat of PKK terrorism prioritized the import 
of such arms (Günlük-Şenesen 2002). In the meantime, the national defense industry 
also started to make observable progress. A law passed in 1985 that aimed to ‘develop 
a modern defense industry and ensure the modernization of the Turkish armed 
forces’ created both a designated budget and a specific Undersecretariat responsible 
for the administration of the sector.2  In 1996 the efforts to modernize the army were 
boosted by an increase in the dedicated budget which was expected to be $150 billion 
over the following 30 years (Hen-Tov 2004). The dedicated budget was renewed once 
again in 2000 and $20 billion was spared to be spent on the modernization of the 
army over the course of ten years (Akça 2010).  
It needs to be noted that Turkey's attempts to develop its national defense 
industry has not always raised eyebrows among its Western allies. The USA was 
 
2 Savunma Sanayii İle İlgili Bazi Düzenlemeler Hakkinda Kanun No.3238 Date 7/11/1985 





supportive of the steps taken by Turkey primarily for commercial reasons (the 
possibility of a partnership between American and Turkish firms that would create 
new markets for American interests). The European partners saw this as a 
commercial opportunity, as well but they were also interested in the contribution such 
a development would make to European countries’ attempts to become less 
dependent on the USA for their security needs (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017). Turkey started 
to take part in ‘European military-industrial projects’ which also helped repatch 
Turkey’s relations with the European Economic Community (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017).  
The most important progress in developing a national defense industry took 
place under the JDP rule. Because of the opacity that surrounds data regarding the 
defense industry, it is very difficult to get an accurate picture of how much of Turkey's 
national defense needs are met domestically. The most frequently cited numbers by 
the officials, including Hulusi Akar, the Minister of Defense, state that the Turkish 
national defense industry now produces about 70% of its military's needs which is a 
testament of progress compared to earlier periods (Sözcü 2019).  
When the JDP came to power, they made it a point to distinguish their 
foreign policy approach from earlier periods, at least in rhetoric. Kemalist foreign 
policy was considered to be realist, cautious, reactive, and predominantly Western-
oriented while JDP illustrated ambition to have a proactive foreign policy that is more 
engaged with its regional politics (Zürcher 2004). When JDP came to power they had 
a rather pro-EU attitude which led to many legal and political reforms and friendly 
relations with Western allies. However, due to several reasons explained below 
Turkey’s relations with the USA and Western European countries, and by extension, 
NATO started to fluctuate. While such fluctuations in Turkey’s relations with NATO 
are not peculiar to this new era, they nevertheless, presented an impetus for the 
development of the Turkish defense industry to pick up speed.  
The reoccurring tensions between NATO and Turkey generally resulted 
from escalated tension between Turkey and the USA but were not limited to it. The 
first tension between the USA and Turkey of the JDP era took place in 2003 when 
the Turkish parliament, in the wake of the War in Iraq, rejected the proposal to allow 
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more than 60,000 American troops to operate out of Turkish bases which forced the 
entire war plan to be revised and to be delayed (CNN 2003). The civil war in Syria, 
that started in 2011, also contributed to the straining of relations between the USA 
and Turkey as they had different priorities in the region. The USA has been 
prioritizing defeating ISIS in Syria and cooperating with various armed non-state 
actors in doing so - including Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat—
PYD). Turkey considers PYD as an extension of the terrorist organization Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistani—PKK), that Turkey has been fighting 
against for over thirty years and the support they receive from the USA was not 
welcomed by Turkey. On the other hand, for Turkey, the priority was to see the 
Bashar al-Asad government overthrown which Turkish policymakers thought was a 
done deal at the beginning of the civil war (Park 2015). 
Turkey’s relations with NATO has also suffered many smaller tensions 
including Turkey’s reluctance about the appointment of former Danish Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the Secretary-General of NATO due to his 
stance during the Muhammad cartoons controversy (resulted from the depiction of 
Prophet Muhammad in a series of cartoons published by a Danish newspaper which 
Muslims perceived as blasphemy).  Turkey’s initial opposition to the deployment of 
NATO forces to Libya in 2011 (which resulted from Turkey’s concerns about other 
Muslim countries’ reaction to a NATO involvement in a Muslim country) also led to 
concerns about Turkey’s commitment to the alliance (Oğuzlu 2013). 
NATO has not been the only side in this relationship that has concerns 
about the other's commitment. Turkey also interpreted several steps taken by NATO 
as signs of less than full commitment to Turkey’s protection. Following the downing 
of a Turkish jet by Syrian forces in 2012, Patriot missiles, contributed by Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the USA were stationed by NATO in the Southern border of 
Turkey (NATO 2017). In August 2015 first Germany and then the USA announced 
their plans for the withdrawal of their batteries. After the downing of a Russian jet by 
Turkish defense forces in November 2015, while voicing concerns about getting 
NATO dragged into a conflict with Russia, NATO agreed to increase its ‘air and 





maritime presence along the borders and prevent future incidents’, (Sloat 2018, p.15) 
which fell short of Turkey's expectations. The failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, 
not only created a significant trauma but also impacted Turkey’s threat perceptions 
and increased concerns about Western allies’ commitment to protecting Turkey 
(Egeli 2019). As discussed below, these concerns led to a warming of relations with 
Russia which later affected the defense procurement decisions.  
The above historical account illustrates that the current tension between 
Turkey and NATO is not unprecedented. Historically, while NATO membership was 
crucial to Turkey’s defense capabilities, the fluctuating relations also created 
incentives for Turkey to invest in its defense industry. Combined with domestic 
factors, these developments paved the way for Turkey to become a sizeable defense 
producer and heightened the calls for/ worries about Turkey’s potential departure 
from NATO. The next section details out how the desire to develop the defense 
industry is likely to keep Turkey in NATO rather than drifting them apart.  
 
4.2. The Ties that Bind: The National Defense Industry as an Impetus for Sustaining Turkey-
NATO Relations 
While Turkey’s perceived need to become self-reliant in its defense needs 
was the driving force behind the investment in the defense industry, further 
developing the defense industry depends on (i) the sustained flow of imports needed 
for production and (ii) increased export capacity. Due to the path dependency that 
Turkey’s NATO membership created, both of these conditions could not be met, at 
least in the foreseeable, if Turkey were to have a complete fallout with NATO.  
The steps taken to rely more on the national defense industry led to both an 
increased domestic production and also a further integration into the global market 
at the same time (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017). Turkey’s progress in developing indigenous 
defense technologies was crucial in it. For instance, Bayraktar TB23, an unmanned 
 
3 There are speculations about the role of a British company, EDO MBM Technology, in the provision 
of ‘missile racks’ in the early development stages of the TB2. Neither side confirms the transaction 
and it is accepted that the final product is using components developed and produced in Turkey 
(Guardian 2019). 
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aerial vehicle (UAV) produced by Baykar not only exemplifies indigenous 
technological achievement but also had a demonstrable effect on Turkey’s ability to 
project its military capacity independent of its Western allies. Bayraktar TB2 got 
battle-tested in Syria, Libya, and was recently used by Azerbaijan in the Karabakh 
conflict and Baykar has already signed deals with Qatar and Ukraine for the sale of 
Bayraktar TB2 (Bekdil 2020).   
The policymakers are aware of the need to find a place for Turkish products 
in the global market to sustain the growth of the industry. The Presidency of Defense 
Industries states in a report prepared in 2018 that 
Within the scope of the protection of Turkish money, restrictions were 
imposed on foreign currency billing in domestic projects. As the healthiest way 
to provide foreign currency input to domestic firms is to increase exports, 
exports were identified as one of the main elements of establishing a sustainable 
and competitive defense industry ecosystem… (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 
2018, p.12) 
Turkey has steadily increased its position in the global defense market and 
as of 2019, Turkey ranks as the 12th largest arms exporter in the world with a sale 
volume of $ 245 million worth of arms (See Table 2). Two Turkish companies 
ASELSAN and Turkish Aerospace Industries rank among the Top 100 arms-




4 The significantly increased production capacity along with the observed impact that defense exports 
have on Turkey's relations with its trade partners gave Turkey a boost of confidence regarding its 
ability to become autarkic and also project power through exports. Despite such progress, there is still 
a large gap between the largest arms exporters and the rest of the world, thus Turkey’s increased 
production and export volume needs to be contextualized within the hierarchical structure of the 
global defense market (See Table 1) Thus while increasing its share Turkey has not developed the 
capacity to match the lead exporters in the industry. 






Table 2 - Turkey’s ranking in ‘Top 50 Largest Exporters’  
Year Ranking Arms exportsa  
2019 12 245 
2018 13 265 
2017 14 171 
2016 14 232 
2015 15 248 
2014 18 165 
2013 18 156 
2012 22 143 
2011 23 86 
2010 22 72 
2009 19 63 
2008 21 111 
2007 20 66 
2006 27 82 
2005 28 23 
2004 26 28 
2003 30 42 
2002 36 26 
2001 27 5 
2000 25 19 
ain US$ millions 
Source: Table compiled by the author based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database “TIV of arms 












Table 3 - ASELSAN’s and Turkish Aerospace Industries’ ranking in ‘Arms 
Industry Database Top 100’  
ASELSAN Turkish Aerospace Industries 
Year Ranking Arms salesa  Ranking Arms salesa  
2018 54 1740 84 1070 
2017 62 1440 71 1240 
2016 70 1200 79 1120 
2015 76 1000 83 890 
2014 76 1130 95 850 
2013 71 1110 - - 
2012 91 860 - - 
2011 91 850 - - 
2010 92 760 - - 
aIn US$ millions  
Source: Table is compiled by the author based on The SIPRI Arms Industry Database Top 100 
for 2002-2018 (excluding China) https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry1 
 
Turkey has been capitalizing on its NATO membership as a way of 
increasing exports. To further utilize this connection, Turkey specifically focused on 
finding ways to take part in multinational projects such as the ones developed by 
NATO and Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) and also 
through bilateral deals5 (Bağcı & Kurç 2017). The Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industries prepared a 2017-2021 International Cooperation and Export Strategic Plan 
in which ‘Increasing the Contribution of NATO-CNAD [Conference of National 
Armaments Directors] Activities to International Cooperation and Industrialization 
Activities’ was identified as one of the strategic goals. The roadmap to this strategic 
goal was explained as  
with a holistic approach, increasing the contribution of armament cooperation 
to industrialization activities within NATO, more effective representation and 
 
5 Turkey is a ‘non-member programme participating state’ http://www.occar.int/about-us 





promotion in NATO, more effective participation of SSM project groups in 
working groups, the ability of SSM project units to benefit from information 
gained in NATO more effectively,….the industry is aimed to take a more active 
role in NATO (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017, p.8). 
Thus, cooperation and coordination with NATO are perceived by 
policymakers as an essential component for the sustained growth of the national 
defense industry. Moreover, Turkish firms actively seek NATO certification both to 
be able to sell their products to NATO countries and also to use the certification as 
an indication of their quality in promoting the products to other countries.6   
While a significant increase in exports is contributing to Turkey both 
economically and diplomatically, the Turkish national defense industry’s continued 
reliance on imports creates an important incentive for Turkey to stay committed to 
NATO. Table 4 illustrates that as Turkey was increasing its level of exports in arms 
it sustained its level of imports in arms industries. Turkey currently ranks as the 10th 
largest arms importer in the world. Moreover, most of the imports come from NATO 
allies (See Table 5) which is an outcome of the historical process through which the 












6 See for instance ‘Nato Sertifikasına Bir Adım Kaldı’ (One Step Left for NATO Certification) 
Cumhuriyet 27 June 2019 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/nato-sertifikasina-bir-adim-kaldi-
1460313 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 6(2) 2020: 259-295, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v6n2p259 
280 
 
Table 4 - Turkey’s ranking in ‘Top 50 Largest Importers’ 
Year Ranking Arms importsa  
2019 10 833 
2018 13 591 
2017 23 425 
2016 23 331 
2015 18 441 
2014 3 1526 
2013 8 796 
2012 3 1500 
2011 13 779 
2010 15 484 
2009 12 732 
2008 12 640 
2007 12 692 
2006 13 531 
2005 5 1095 
2004 22 257 
2003 15 330 
2002 3 905 
2001 12 510 
2000 3 2521 
ain $ millions 
Source: Table compiled by the author based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database “TIV of arms 









Table 5 - Turkey's Defense Imports (2000-2019) 
 
 a Bold indicates NATO members. 
b in US$ millions 
Source: Table compiled by the author based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database “TIV of arms 
exports to Turkey, 2000-2019” http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php 
 
Not just the sheer volume of the defense imports but also the content of 
the imported goods has implications for Turkey’s relations with NATO. Turkey 
progressed from importing off-the-shelf, completed weapons system to the import 
of  ‘critical systems, sub-systems, and components, such as engines and radars instead 
of major platform’ (Bağcı & Kurç 2017, p.45). Despite these changes, Turkey still 
needs imported parts and technology to be able to produce much of its domestically 
manufactured arms and licenses to be able to sell them in the global market. For 
instance, first locally produced helicopter T129 ATAK was built in cooperation with 
AgustaWestland (an Italian company) and used American-made engines. Similarly, 
the production of Altay tank and TF-X combat aircraft as well as UAVs depend on 
imported parts and technology (SIPRI 2020a). Thus, Turkey’s ability to export its 
products which will be produced by using foreign supplied components rely heavily 
on Turkey’s friendly relations with these supplying countries especially since they 
require export licenses (Bakeer 2019). The importance of this became clear when 
Turkey’s deal with Pakistan for the sale of the T129 ATAK helicopter got halted due 
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to the US’s refusal to provide export licenses for the engine used in the helicopter 
(Bekdil 2018).  
The role of NATO countries in the development of the Turkish defense 
industry is not limited to imported goods and technologies. ‘Direct investments and 
joint ventures’ have played an important role in the development of the national 
defense industry (Kurç 2017). Not just economic calculations but also security 
calculations play a role in these companies’ presence in other countries. A recent study 
by SIPRI illustrates that ‘geopolitical alignment’ has an impact on the international 
presence of arms companies, the fact that Turkey is a NATO member is a crucial 
reason behind the operation of these firms. According to SIPRI’s study, Turkey hosts 
several ‘foreign entities’ from NATO countries such as ‘BAE Systems, L3Harris 
Technologies, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, and Thales’ (SIPRI 2020b, 7).  
International companies’ presence in Turkey also takes the form of directly owning 
companies as we see in Leonardo Turkey Havacılık Savunma ve Güvenlik Sistemleri 
AŞ (SIPRI 2020a). The active presence of foreign defense companies not only 
provides the necessary technology for indigenous systems to be developed, but also 
further contributes to the benefits of NATO membership (Kurç 2017). As it can be 
observed from the above discussion, NATO membership played a crucial role in the 
direction and pace of the development that the Turkish defense industry experienced. 
It is also visible that sustained development is closely linked to continuation of 
relations with NATO.  
 
4.3 The Rules that Bind: NATO’s Coercive Instruments as Obstacles for Turkish Defense Industry 
Turkey’s dependency on its NATO allies, in general, and the USA, in 
particular, is not only sustained with the opportunities (such as the reliance on the 
import of technology, parts from the allies as well as issues of licensing) that the 
Alliance presents for the Turkish defense industry, but ‘sticks’ of various forms 
(economic, political and military) have been used by NATO to remind Turkey of the 
potential consequences of breaking away from the Alliance. Sanctions and embargoes 
have been the primary way through which NATO tried to keep Turkey stay in line 





with NATO’s security priorities. For instance, Turkey’s involvement in Syria led to 
not just straining diplomatic relations with NATO countries but also resulted in a ban 
on arms sales that came after the initiation of Turkish military operation into Syria 
(Operation Peace Spring) in the Fall of 2019. Several NATO countries including the 
USA, the UK, France, Germany, Finland, Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, the Czech 
Republic, and Sweden have placed sanctions on arms sales (Bekdil & Bodner 2019; 
Koyuncu 2019). Since Turkey still relies on imports, primarily from NATO countries, 
it harmed Turkey’s ability to meet its defense needs.  
Another concrete example of the use of coercive capacity was seen after 
Turkey announced its decision to buy an anti-missile defense system from a Chinese 
Company that was under US sanctions. The fact that Turkey’s existing air defense 
systems (such as the Hawks, Stingers, Nike Hercules, and Papiers) are both outdated 
and limited in their ranges makes Turkey rely too heavily on defending Turkish 
airspace through the patrolling done by F-16 fighter jets (which themselves are aging) 
(Kibaroğlu 2019). Thus, Turkey’s desire to better its air defense system came as no 
surprise. Turkey tried to fill this gap by deploying Patriots (which were temporarily 
deployed in 1991, 2003, and 2013) (NATO 2013), but the agreement could not have 
been reached. In 2009 Turkey issued a call for the purchase of a ‘long-range air and 
missile defense system’ and got offers from China, Russia, the USA, and a France-
Italian consortium. Turkey first announced its intention to buy an anti-missile defense 
system from a Chinese state-owned company (China Precision Machinery Import and 
Export Corporation (CPMEIC)) in 2013 which was not realized eventually. During 
this process, when ASELSAN asked Merill Lynch, one of the world’s biggest 
investment banks ‘to advise and to underwrite its public offering’ they were given a 
rejection stating that ‘If it is possible that you will work with the Chinese company… 
we would not work with you’ (Sağlam 2013 cited in Egeli 2019, p.78). This example 
illustrated how diverging in defense interests from NATO could create reactions not 
just in the form of direct sanctions and embargoes but also in the form of steps taken 
to affect Turkish defense companies’ ability to function in the global market.  
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Turkey’s later decision to buy S-400’s from Russia7 led NATO to resort to 
its coercive mechanisms, with more dire consequences. The formerly strained 
relations warmed up with the failed coup attempt that took place in Turkey on July 
15, 2016. President Putin declared his ‘unconditional support’ for the Turkish 
government, which was different from the cautious stance that NATO members took 
at that moment (Aamodt & Haugom 2019). Turkey establishing warmer relations 
with Russia raised several eyebrows in NATO but the discontent became vocal when 
Turkey announced its decision to purchase the S-400 missile defense system from 
Russia.  
From NATO’s perspective the system’s incompatibility with NATO 
systems8 and the inconsistency that the S-400s will bring to NATO’s defense 
capabilities constituted the operational concerns about this deal. Any purchase to be 
made from outside of NATO countries was evaluated as a threat as they could 
‘jeopardize the integrity of NATO’s sensitive command, control, and communication 
systems as well as its intelligence collecting capability.’ (Kibaroğlu 2019, p.165; 
Kasapoğlu & Ülgen 2019). The fallout of Turkey’s decision to buy S-400s from Russia 
included Turkey's suspension from the US F35 Joint Strike Fighter program to which 
Turkey not only was contributing through manufacturing various parts for the jets 
but also was a customer who placed an order for F35 jets. The coercive capacity of 
the Alliance was encapsulated in a statement made by a NATO official ‘The same 
way that nations are sovereign in making their decisions, they are also sovereign in 
facing the consequences of that decision’ (Defense News 2017). 
In addition to being pushed out of the F35 Program, Turkey is now facing 
US sanctions under the ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act’ 
(CAATSA) ‘knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with Rosoboronexport, 
 
7 ‘Turkey Completes Deal to Buy Antimissile System from Russia,’ Associated Press, December 29, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes. com/2017/12/29/world/europe/turkey-russia-arms-deal.html. 
8 A spokesperson for the US State Department stated in a briefing in May 2018 that ‘Under NATO 
and under the NATO agreement... you’re only supposed to buy... weapons and other material that are 
interoperable with other NATO partners. We don't see [an S-400 system from Russia] as being 
interoperable.’ ‘Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief,’ Every CRSC Report, 6 June 2018. 
(Cited in Kibaroğlu 2019, p.166). 





Russia’s main arms export entity, by procuring the S-400 surface-to-air missile system’ 
(US Department of State, 2020). While the implications of this decision, is yet to be 
seen, it is most likely to prioritize the national defense industry on the political 
rhetoric, while illustrating the difficulties of gaining defense autarky.  
 It needs to be taken into consideration that while NATO’s reaction is 
fueling the anti-NATO rhetoric, the current S-400 purchase or warm relations with 
Russia would not provide Turkey enough of a defense capacity to formally distance 
itself from NATO. First, the S-400s are not ‘compatible with NATO standards and 
cannot be integrated into NATO’s air defense system’, which Turkey still primarily 
relies on its defense structure and strategies. Second, Turkey’s national know-how is 
not likely to benefit from their installment as ‘Russia is not prepared to supply 
software codes, IFF systems, a joint production with Turkey and certainly no 
technology transfer to Turkey’ (Kogan 2018, p.29). Thus, while the reasons behind 
attempts at developing the national defense industry and diversifying its defense 
capacity through new purchases are understandable, the functioning of the global 




This study does neither underestimate the important progress that Turkey 
has made in developing its national defense industry nor overlook the straining of 
relations between Turkey and NATO. However, this study highlights that two 
important factors need to be taken into account before reaching a judgment about 
Turkey’s future in NATO. First, the current problems that Turkey is having with 
NATO need to be understood from a historical perspective. The history of Turkey-
NATO relations is filled with mutual discontent over various policy decisions or lack 
thereof. While this is not to suggest that nothing could lead to Turkey’s departure 
from NATO, the existing problems are not new or necessarily insurmountable.  
Second, it is true that the insecurities Turkey has historically felt in NATO's 
capability and desire to protect Turkey have contributed to its efforts to develop its 
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national defense industry. However, both the structure of the arms market, that 
makes being integrated into the global market a precondition for continued growth, 
and the Turkish national defense industry’s, sustained reliance on imports (most 
importantly in technology) from its Western allies, suggest that continued growth of 
national defense industry (and increased ability of Turkey to defend itself) is 
conditioned upon Turkey’s sustained commitment to its alliances. Moreover, NATO 
not only created path dependency by playing a formative role in the trajectory of the 
Turkish national defense industry’s development but also, through repetitive use of 
its coercive instruments (sanctions and embargoes), NATO tries to sustain that 
trajectory by making Turkey’s attempts to develop its national defense industry 
independent of the Alliance economically and politically costly.  
It would be myopic to suggest that a pragmatic policy choice that prioritizes 
the further development of the national defense industry would be enough of a 
reason for Turkey to sustain its commitment to NATO. Turkey’s commitment to 
NATO and NATO’s commitment to Turkey is conditioned upon several factors 
ranging from political to economic and security calculations. Thus, this study does 
not suggest that Turkey will remain attached to the Alliance despite any problems 
that might arise. On the contrary, the historical evidence and current affairs suggest 
that the relations between Turkey and NATO are likely to see reoccurring tensions.  
As the historical development of the Turkish national defense industry 
suggests, sustained tension with NATO members (specifically with the USA) would 
provide additional impetus for further development of the defense industry. It is also 
reasonable to assume that the national defense industry which President Erdoğan 
perceives and portrays as an important component and indicator of Turkey’s power 
(as well as a bargaining chip) in world politics will be used as an explanation (and 
consolation prize) for Turkey’s severance from NATO if such development were to 
ever happen. However, if Turkey prioritizes the development of the national defense 
industry in shaping its foreign policy, Turkey’s interests will be best served by staying 
in the Alliance. Since defense autarky is not on the horizon, for both technological 
and economic reasons, any calls to replace NATO with any other country or alliance 





needs to be tread lightly as such steps, as far as the national defense industry is 
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